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Chapter 6
Taming the Super-Wicked 
Problem of Waterfront 
Hazard Mitigation Planning: 
The Role of Municipal 
Communication Strategies
Sarah J. Adams-Schoen
[T]he policy process, and government in general, is rife with information, and 
this provides a critical but often overlooked dynamic in politics.1
In the Adaptation Report of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identifies floods in urban 
riverine and coastal areas as among the key climate-related risks for North 
America.2 Not surprisingly for residents of coastal and riverine communities 
devastated by recent extreme weather events, the Adaptation Report acknowl-
edges that risks related to sea-level rise, increased frequency and duration 
of extreme precipitation events, and increasingly intense coastal storms are 
not only future risks, but are current risks that are already manifesting in 
property and infrastructure damage, ecosystem and social system disrup-
tion, public health impacts, and water quality impairment.3 The Adaptation 
Report identifies the current risk level for North American coastal cities as 
“medium” and projects that, with a 2° Centigrade (C) increase in global 
average temperatures over pre-industrial levels, coastal urban areas will have 
to implement “high adaptation” just to maintain the current risk level of 
1. Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government 
Prioritizes Problems 2 (2005).
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability 23 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 IPCC Adaptation Report].
3. Id. at 6.
Author’s Note: The author would like to thank Brian Walsh (Touro Law 2016) for his 
assistance with this chapter.
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medium.4 With a 4°C increase, even high adaptation is projected to have 
little efficacy—indeed, the IPCC reports that under a 4°C pathway North 
American coastal cities will face high risk levels even if they implement high 
adaptation.5 Given that staying within a 2°C pathway appears unlikely,6 poli-
cymakers should heed the IPCC’s projections by implementing waterfront 
development policies consistent with increasingly severe flood risks in both 
current and expanded flood zones.7
Notwithstanding the magnitude of present and future risks to coastal and 
riverine communities, however, waterfront development policies have shifted 
only incrementally. The result has been the continued siting of residential 
communities and critical infrastructure in vulnerable waterfront areas and 
the expansion and entrenchment of policies, behaviors, and preferences that, 
at best, fail to mitigate risk and, at worst, heighten risk. Even communities 
that have otherwise undertaken robust climate change mitigation and adap-
tation planning continue to base waterfront development policies on irra-
tionally discounted risk projections and embrace communication strategies 
that obfuscate the risk and ultimately undermine the communities’ ability 
to adequately respond to the risks. The literature on “wicked” and “super-
wicked” policy problems suggests that, in the current context of heightened 
risk aversion following a major disaster like Hurricanes Sandy8 or Katrina, 
municipal governments in the affected areas have an opportunity to trans-
form waterfront development policies consistent with scientific evidence on 
climate related risks. Shifting waterfront development policies toward resil-
ience likely begins with official communications that accurately portray risk, 
including waterfront and hazard mitigation plans, flood risk maps, and com-
prehensive planning processes, which can facilitate changes in zoning and 
building codes and private market behavior consistent with near- and long-
term risks.
4. Id. at 23.
5. The 2014 IPCC Adaptation Report characterizes the projected risk under a 4°C increase, even with 
high adaptation, to be approximately halfway between “medium” and “very high.” Id.
6. See Veerabhadran Ramanathan & Yan Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference With 
the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 14245, 14245 (2008) 
(estimating global warming of 2.4°C even if greenhouse gas concentrations held to 2005 levels).
7. Throughout this chapter, the word “policy” denotes governmental strategies in response to a problem, 
including communications, plans, and rules, both informal and formal.
8. This chapter refers to Sandy as a “hurricane” because, “although Sandy made landfall [near Brigantine, 
New Jersey] as an extratropical low, its strong winds, heavy rains and storm surge had been felt onshore 
for many hours while Sandy was still a hurricane.” Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical Cyclone Report: 
Hurricane Sandy (AL182012) 22-29 October 2012 4 n.6 (National Hurricane Center Feb. 12, 
2013).
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I. Using the Construct of “Wicked” Policy Problems 
to Shift Waterfront Development Policy to a New 
Equilibrium
Framing waterfront development in the context of climate change as a 
“wicked” or “super-wicked” problem may help guide municipalities toward 
policy strategies that account for risk on a timeframe commensurate with 
the life of new developments and infrastructure. Since 1973, public policy 
scholars and others have been using the term “wicked” to describe and 
analyze strategies for addressing social planning problems that cannot be 
successfully resolved with traditional linear, analytical approaches.9 Charac-
teristics of wicked problems include, among other things, that the problems 
are difficult to define, not entirely solvable, socially complex, and character-
ized by interdependencies that can result in conflicting goals for the various 
stakeholders. Wicked policy problems also tend to exist in complex systems 
such that attempts to address the problems lead to unforeseen or undesirable 
consequences and responses to wicked problems typically involve changing 
behavior.10 When Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber introduced the con-
cept of wicked problems, they argued that current modes of policy analy-
sis promoted rather than solved these complex problems. However, as Kelly 
Levin et al. later observe, “[w]hile Rittel and Webber usefully highlight fea-
tures of problems that decision makers ought to consider when determin-
ing which decision tool to apply, wicked problems arguably describe most 
policy problems.”11 Thus Levin et al. introduced the term “super-wicked” to 
describe anthropogenic climate change and other intractable problems that 
are characterized by the key features of wicked problems as well as four addi-
tional features: (1) time is running out, (2) those who cause the problem also 
seek to provide a solution, (3)  the central authority needed to address the 
problem is weak or nonexistent, and (4) irrational discounting occurs that 
pushes responses into the future.12 These features in concert “create a tragedy 
because our governance institutions, and the policies they generate (or fail to 
generate), largely respond to short-term time horizons even when the cata-
9. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 Pol’y Sci. 155, 
160-69 (1973).
10. See id. at 161-64 (identifying 10 characteristics of wicked problems).
11. Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to 
Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 Policy Sci. 123, 127 (2012).
12. Levin et al. first identified climate change as a super-wicked problem in a conference paper in 2007. 
See Kelly Levin et al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super 
Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, presented at International Studies Association Conven-
tion, Chicago, Ill., Feb. 28-Mar. 3, 2007.
126 Contemporary Issues in Climate Change Law & Policy
strophic implications of doing so are far greater than any real or perceived 
benefits of inaction.”13
While anthropogenic climate change is the prototypical example of a 
“super-wicked” problem, waterfront hazard mitigation planning and related 
lawmaking also embody the attributes of a super-wicked policy problem.14 
As with national and international climate issues, climate-related waterfront 
risks embody the characteristics of wicked problems. Climate-related water-
front risks have multiple causal factors, including coastal erosion and storms, 
dam failure, disease outbreak, floods, landslides, land subsidence, building 
collapse, infrastructure failure, and utility disruptions.15 High levels of dis-
agreement exist about the nature of the risks and their potential solutions.16 
And, the motivation and behavior of individuals is a key part of any solution. 
Indeed, a range of cognitive processes affect assessment of redevelopment 
in the wake of disaster and often “militate in favor of development even 
where such development is ‘irrational’ in the market sense that risks out-
weigh benefits.”17 Climate-related waterfront risks are also characterized by 
the four additional “super-wicked” attributes.
A. Time Is Running Out
Infrastructure lock-in and increasing flood and storm surge risk levels over 
time mean that time is not costless. The U.S. population is expected to grow 
to 420 million by 2050, resulting in the projected construction between 
2007 and 2050 of 89 million new or replaced homes and 190 billion square 
feet of new offices, institutions, stores, and other nonresidential buildings.18 
Based on these projections, two-thirds of homes and buildings in existence in 
2050 will be built between 2007 and then.19 Given that more than one-half 
the U.S. population lives in coastal watershed counties and population den-
13. Levin et al., supra note 11, at 124.
14. This is not to say that waterfront hazard mitigation in the context of a changing climate embodies all 
the characteristics that make anthropogenic climate change a super-wicked problem. See Richard J. 
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 
Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1161-87 (2009) (asserting that national climate change legislation presents a 
super-wicked problem as a result of the nature of climate change itself, human nature, and the nature 
of U.S. lawmaking institutions).
15. See, e.g., City of New York, 2014 New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan 47-48 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Niki L. Pace, Wetlands or Seawalls? Adapting Shoreline Regulation to Address Sea Level Rise 
and Wetland Preservation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 327, 329 (2011); see 
also National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), State of the Coast: Shoreline 
Armoring: The Pros and Cons, http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/shoreline/shoreline_armoring.html.
17. See generally Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 213, 242-43 (2013).
18. Reid Ewing et al., Growing Cooler: Evidence on Urban Development and Climate Change 
8 (2008).
19. Id.
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sity continues to grow in these counties,20 it seems likely that, absent policies 
that limit waterfront development, a large portion of new homes and build-
ings, as well as related infrastructure, will be constructed in waterfront areas.
On a personal scale, time is not costless for those who are rebuilding in, 
relocating to, and choosing to remain in hazardous areas where future prop-
erty damage and public health problems including loss of life are foreseeable 
results of new and continued waterfront development. Thus, not surprisingly, 
the IPCC highlights the importance of “city and municipal governments 
acting now to incorporate climate change adaptation into their development 
plans and policies and infrastructure investments.”21
B. The Same Actors Both Cause and Seek to Solve the Problem
Those who contribute to the problem of increased waterfront risks also seek 
to end the problem. For example, many waterfront property owners use 
shoreline armoring22 in an attempt to protect their property from erosion 
and flood risks, while this same armoring often leads to the “unintended . . . 
consequences [of] vertical erosion, loss of downdrift sediment, and erosion 
of flanking shores.”23 Likewise, following Sandy, many waterfront munici-
palities amended their zoning and building codes to facilitate and encourage 
development and redevelopment in floodplains, notwithstanding the height-
ened risks that would occur as a result of increasing impermeable surface 
areas, which tends to increase flood risk, and attracting greater numbers of 
people into vulnerable areas.24
Indeed, even a report on achieving hazard-resilient coastal communi-
ties published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encourages 
20. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency, National Coastal Population Report: Population 
Trends From 1970 to 2020 11 (2013).
21. 2014 IPCC Adaptation Report, supra note 2, at 541 (emphasis added).
22. “Armoring” refers to the use of hard structures to protect shoreline properties from flooding and 
erosion, including, for example, bulkheads, seawalls, groins, and revetments. Pace, supra note 16, at 
338.
23. Id. (citing Scott L. Douglass & Bradley H. Pickel, The Tide Doesn’t Go Out Anymore: The Effect of 
Bulkheads on Urban Bay Shorelines, 67 Shore & Beach 19, 19 (1999)).
24. See, e.g., New York City Building Code (NYCBC), app. G, §304.1.1 (2014) (requiring one- to two-
family residences be flood-proofed to two feet above Base Flood Elevation); id. at §302.1.1 (requiring 
30 feet of ramp for a 30-inch rise). Depending on the amount of stairs or ramping required to access 
the elevated structure, the structure may need to be shifted back from the street, thereby occupying 
space that had previously been the backyard, and addition of lengthy switchback ramps and stairs 
needed to access an elevated first floor may increase the impermeable area of the structure. See City of 
New York, Coastal Climate Resiliency: Retrofitting Buildings for Fluid Risk 42-43 (2014); 
see also Oregon Dep’t of Land Conservation, Water Quality Model Code and Guide Book 
4.44 (2000) (discussing disruptions caused by building impervious surfaces in floodplains).
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rebuilding in coastal areas, albeit with design and siting decisions based on 
smart growth principles.25 The report’s 10 “smart growth and hazard mitiga-
tion strategies specifically for coastal and waterfront communities” do not 
include any suggestion that waterfront development be restricted or lim-
ited and only one strategy that would have this effect,26 despite recognition 
that “[i]nfill development may increase risk if existing development is in a 
hazard-prone location” and “[k]eeping development out of flood-prone areas 
protects lives and property and allows alternative uses of the land, such as 
public waterfront parks and recreation areas.”27 Conflicting messages like 
these from stakeholders committed to increasing resilience reflect economic 
and political realities, to be sure, but they also illustrate the super-wicked 
nature of the problem presented by waterfront development in the context of 
a changing climate.
C. Weak or Nonexistent Central Authority to Address the Problem
Authority over waterfront hazard mitigation is fragmented and diffuse. 
Although federal and state law delegates much of the authority relevant to cli-
mate change adaptation to municipal governments, municipal governments’ 
ability to adequately respond to climate-related hazards is often constrained 
by unmet needs for funding and technical support and a lack of complimen-
tary state and federal laws and policies.28 In 2011, approximately 90% of all 
U.S. cities surveyed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a joint 
project with ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability reported that they 
face challenges securing funding for adaptation, and only 6% reported that 
the federal government understood the realities they face with respect to 
adaptation.29 Likewise, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded in a 2013 report that, although the federal government plays a 
25. Achieving Hazard-Resilient Coastal & Waterfront Smart Growth: Coastal and Water-
front Smart Growth and Hazard Mitigation Roundtable Report 6 (2013). Strategy three is 
to “[p]rovide a range of housing opportunities and choices to meet the needs of both seasonal and 
permanent residents” and strategy seven is to “[s]trengthen and direct development toward existing 
communities, and encourage waterfront revitalization.” Id.
26. Strategy 6 is to “[p]reserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and the critical environmental areas 
that characterize and support coastal and waterfront communities.” Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 8.
28. See generally John R. Nolon, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: The Quest for Green Com-
munities, Part II, Plan. & Envtl. L., Nov. 2009, at 3, 5. But see Community Risk and Resiliency 
Act, 2014 N.Y. Laws 355 (directing state agencies to prepare model municipal laws taking into 
consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related events and “develop additional guidance on the 
use of resiliency measures that utilize natural resources and natural processes to reduce risk”).
29. JoAnn Carmin et al., Progress and Challenges in Urban Climate Adaptation Planning: 
Results of a Global Survey 22-24 (2012). ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability is an as-
sociation of more than 1,000 cities, towns, and metropolises committed to sustainability. See ICLEI-
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critical role in producing the information needed to facilitate informed local 
infrastructure adaptation decisions, this information is not easily accessible 
to local decisionmakers.30 The governors, mayors, and other local leaders on 
the President’s Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience also con-
cluded in their report to the President in November 2014 that “projects and 
investments are being advanced without adequate and coordinated consid-
eration of the project design or alternatives relative to climate impacts . . . , a 
direction that generates unacceptable public health, safety, and financial risks 
for communities.”31 Similarly, a 2014 Georgetown Climate Center report on 
how to improve federal programs to support local climate change prepared-
ness found that many local governments “have been looking to the federal 
government for help and guidance, only to run into challenges tapping into 
federal programs and resources.”32
Additionally, with respect to waterfront hazard mitigation in particu-
lar, a complex web of more than a dozen local, state, and federal laws 
implemented by an even greater number of agencies, departments, com-
missions, and task forces create a policy regime characterized by frag-
mentation and diffuse authority.33 Waterfront policies and projects also 
often implicate state common law and statutory public trust doctrine34 
as well as federal takings jurisprudence.35 Furthermore, even at the sub-
state levels waterfront policies tend to be scattered throughout numerous 
Local Governments for Sustainability, Who We Are, ICLEI.org, http://www.iclei.org/about/
who-is-iclei.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
30. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Report: Future Federal Adaptation Efforts 
Could Better Support Local Infrastructure Decision Makers 80 (Apr. 12, 2012).
31. See The White House, President’s State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate 
Preparedness and Resilience: Recommendations to the President 20 (Nov. 2014).
32. Georgetown Climate Ctr., Preparing Our Communities for Climate Impacts: Recommenda-
tions for Federal Action 5 (2014).
33. See, e.g., The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1454 (2012); Submerged Lands Act of 
1953, 43 U.S.C. §1312 (2006); Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §1452(2)(K) (2006); New 
York State Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Act, N.Y. Comp. Codes 
R. & Regs. tit. 19, §600.1(c) (2012); Tidal Wetlands Act (TWA), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 
tit. 6, §661.1 (2012); New York Coastal Erosion Hazard Area Act (CEHA), N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. 
Law §34-0102(5) (McKinney 2012); New York City Department of City Planning, The New 
Waterfront Revitalization Program 3 (2002); Zoning Resolution Text, N.Y.C. Dep’t of City 
Plan’g (Apr. 28, 2015); see also N.Y. Exec. Law §§910-923 (authorizing local waterfront revitaliza-
tion plans); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 19, §601 (2012) (implementing optional LWRP 
provisions); see generally Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Sink or Swim: In Search of a Model for Coastal City 
Climate Resilience, 40 Col. J. Envtl. L. 433, 473-79 (2015) (discussing web of federal, state, and 
local laws applicable to New York City waterfront).
34. See The Underwater Lands Bill, Act of Aug. 7, ch. 791, §3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 4028, 4029 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. Pub. Lands Law §75 (McKinney 2014)).
35. See, e.g., New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 v. City of New York, No. D42904 (N.Y App. Div. Nov. 19, 
2014) (finding reasonable probability that city wetlands designation is a regulatory taking under 
federal Constitution).
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plans including local comprehensive plans, waterfront revitalization plans, 
and hazard mitigation plans.36 Although in most jurisdictions zoning laws 
must be consistent with a municipality’s comprehensive plan,37 which may 
be interpreted to include all relevant planning activities,38 and local, state, 
and federal actions must be consistent with any local waterfront revitaliza-
tion plan,39 often the numerous plans setting forth waterfront policies in 
a municipality fail to cross-reference one another, are developed by vari-
ous planning authorities that may not collaborate with one another, and 
ultimately may contain conflicts.40 With respect to this fragmentation at 
the planning level, a roundtable of experts from the fields of smart growth, 
hazard mitigation, climate change adaptation, and coastal management 
recognized the need to link hazard mitigation and land use planning pro-
cesses, further research the potential for one plan to serve multiple plan-
ning requirements, and provide tools and technical assistance to better 
integrate plans at the local level.41 In the meanwhile, however, the existing 
fragmentation means that central authority over waterfront hazard miti-
gation remains weak or nonexistent.
36. See, e.g., City of New York, PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 57-65 (June 
2013) [hereinafter Stronger, More Resilient] (setting forth 37 initiatives to increase resilience of 
city’s waterfront); N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Vision 2020: New York City Comprehensive 
Waterfront Plan (March 2011) [hereinafter Vision 2020]; N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, The 
New Waterfront Revitalization Program 3 (2002); N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, The New 
York City Waterfront Revitalization Program: New York City Approved Revisions Pursu-
ant to Section 197-a of the City Charter (2013); City of New York, 2014 New York City 
Hazard Mitigation Plan (2014).
37. See Patricia E. Salkin, 1 N.Y. Zoning Law & Prac. §4:03 (reporting that enabling statutes in 
most states require zoning to be in accordance with the comprehensive plan); Edward J. Sullivan & 
Jennifer Bragar, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning, 46 Urb. Law. 685, 689-90 (2014) 
(reporting trend in case law toward view that comprehensive plan is at least a factor in judicial 
analysis of zoning law).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Town Law §272-a(2)(a) (defining comprehensive plan as “the materials, written and/
or graphic, including but not limited to maps, charts, studies, resolutions, reports and other descrip-
tive material that identify the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards, devices and 
instruments for the immediate and long-range protection, enhancement, growth and development 
of the” municipality).
39. See 16 U.S.C. §§1456(c)(1)-(2) & (d) (2015); 15 C.F.R. pt. 930 (2015); see, e.g., 42 N.Y. Exec. Law 
§916 (McKinney 2014) (requiring “state agency program actions be undertaken in a manner which 
is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the approved [local] waterfront revitalization 
program [LWRP],” including reviews conducted under the state environmental quality review act”); 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, §97.12(d)(13) (2015) (providing for state environmental 
impact review based on effects of proposed action on applicable policies of LWRP as opposed to state 
WRP when municipality has an approved LWRP).
40. See Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36, at 40 (concluding that “[e]fforts by [the multiple] 
agencies [with regulatory authority in the coastal zones] are not completely aligned” and “[t]his lack 
of unified and coordinated regulatory oversight can lead to delayed and unpredictable waterfront 
activity, complicating the achievement of important public goals, including coastal resiliency”).
41. NOAA, Achieving Hazard-Resilient Coastal & Waterfront Smart Growth: Coastal and 
Waterfront Smart Growth and Hazard Mitigation Roundtable Report 11 (2013).
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D. Irrational Discounting of Climate-Related Waterfront Risks Pushes 
Responses Into the Future
Examples of local government plans, reports, executive orders, and other 
communications that irrationally discount climate related waterfront risks 
abound—even in jurisdictions that are otherwise undertaking robust cli-
mate adaptation initiatives. For example, following Hurricane Sandy, state 
and local governments along the East Coast of the United States charac-
terized the storm as “unthinkable,” “unique,” and the “perfect storm.”42 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in these communications was the message 
that the magnitude of and devastation from Sandy were unforeseeable and 
that Sandy was a “worst case scenario” that resulted from the confluence of 
highly improbable factors. Although containing some elements of truth, each 
of these characterizations is potentially misleading.
Rather than being “unthinkable,” the magnitude and devastation of the 
storm was foreseeable. Prior to the storm, numerous sources including state 
and local government agencies had projected extreme flooding and significant 
property damage for vulnerable coastal areas along the east coast of the United 
States. New York and New Jersey had both adopted master plans and issued 
reports predicting the growing dangers from continued waterfront develop-
ment.43 More than eight years before Sandy, Princeton University reported 
that the rapid population growth in New Jersey’s “coastal counties was setting 
the scene for monumental environmental damage and property loss.”44
Notwithstanding the foreseeability of rising sea levels and storm surges, 
however, heavy development of vulnerable flood prone areas continued. On 
Staten Island, “developers built more than 2,700 mostly residential structures 
in coastal areas at extreme risk of storm surge flooding between 1980 and 
2008, with the approval of city planning and zoning authorities. . . .”45 The 
devastation of these areas during Sandy and other extreme weather events 
42. Cavan Sieczkowski, Hurricane Sandy Damage Photos: Superstorm’s “Unthinkable” Aftermath Revealed 
(PICTURES), Huffington Post (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/
hurricane-sandy-damage-photos-superstorm-unthinkable-aftermath_n_2044099.html (“Chris Christie 
said the wreckage is ‘beyond anything I thought I’d ever see.’ Adding, ‘The level of devastation at the 
Jersey Shore is unthinkable,’ according to CNN.”).
43. See Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability for Failure 
to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 775, 782 n.46 (2013) (citing New York and 
New Jersey master plans and reports predicting the growing dangers from continued development).
44. John Rudolf et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck Development of Coast, Huffington 
Post (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandy-
damage_n_2114525.html.
45. See John Rudolf et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck Development of Coast, Huff-
ington Post (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-
sandy-damage_n_2114525.html.
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included loss of lives, displacement of thousands of residents and businesses, 
and massive property and infrastructure losses.46 Ultimately, New Jersey suf-
fered economic losses from Hurricane Sandy of $9 to $15 billion47 and New 
York suffered economic losses of $19 billion.48
Since Sandy, by repeatedly employing language like “unique” and “worst 
case scenario” to describe Sandy,49 local governments continue to give the 
impression that the storm was an anomaly that is unlikely to recur. Although 
Sandy was indeed unprecedented in some respects (for example, it had the 
lowest recorded sea-level pressure of a storm making landfall north of North 
Carolina in the United States50), a storm of Sandy’s magnitude is not unprec-
edented in the region, and a different set of circumstances could have made 
Sandy even more devastating than it was. Since 1900, the New York City 
region has experienced storms with higher wind speeds,51 more rain,52 and 
peak surges 10 feet or higher above mean low tide.53 Moreover, although a 
number of idiosyncratic factors combined to increase Sandy’s devastation, 
Sandy itself was not a worst-case scenario. Had Sandy struck at high tide in 
Western Long Island Sound, as opposed to near high tide in New York Har-
bor and along the Atlantic Ocean, modeling by the storm surge research team 
at the Stevens Institute of Technology projects that Sandy’s peak surge would 
have been four feet higher than it was.54 The city of New York provides most 
of this information in publicly accessible reports; however, these reports tend 
to highlight—through themes, headers, and executive summaries—charac-
terizations of the storm as an anomaly unlikely to occur again.55
46. See Burkett, supra note 43, at 782 (“At least two fatalities in Staten Island occurred in develop-




49. See, e.g., Michael R. Bloomberg, Foreword, in Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36 (referring 
to Sandy as “the worst natural disaster ever to hit New York City”).
50. Blake et al., supra note 8, at 6.
51. Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36, at 21 (“[Sandy’s] 80-mile-per-hour (mph) peak wind 
gusts fell well short of other storms that have hit New York City, including Hurricane Carol in 1954 
(up to 125-mph gusts) and Hurricane Belle in 1976 (up to 95-mph gusts).”).
52. Id. (“Previous storms also brought much more rain with them. Sandy dropped a scant inch in some 
parts of New York, far less than the 5 inches of rain dropped on the city during Hurricane Donna in 
1960 or the 7.5 inches during the April 2007 nor’easter.”).
53. See id. at 21 (discussing 1821 hurricane (13-foot storm surge) and Hurricane Donna in 1960 (10-foot 
storm surge)); Ben Strauss et al., New York and the Surging Sea: A Vulnerability Assessment 
With Projections for Sea Level Rise and Coastal Flood Risk, Climate Central Research 
Report 11, 16 (2014) (noting that storms today are intensified in terms of surge height and other 
variables as a result of higher sea levels and arguing that Sandy’s surge height has been misreported as 
14 feet at the Battery and that Sandy’s peak storm surge was actually nine feet).
54. See Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36, at 21 (describing projected impacts under a western 
Long Island Sound high-tide scenario).
55. See, e.g., Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36.
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Exacerbating the discounting effect of this messaging, a theme that 
New York City and New Yorkers are tougher than climate change is woven 
throughout the city’s voluminous climate resilience reports. For example, the 
June 2013 post-Sandy report, Stronger, More Resilient New York, tells a persua-
sive story of toughness and machismo:
The underlying goal of this report is resiliency. That is, to adapt our city to 
the impacts of climate change and to seek to ensure that, when nature over-
whelms our defenses from time to time, we are able to recover more quickly.
In short, we have to be tough.
And toughness, as we all know, is one of the defining traits of New Yorkers.
In just the first few years of this century, we have been through the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, financial crises and blackouts, and now, Sandy. 
With each challenge, we have become more united as a city.
We must come together again with an even stronger commitment to slow the 
progress of climate change while simultaneously preparing for the changes 
already evident around us—and those yet to come.
. . . . .
The time has come to make our city even tougher.56
Newer reports issued under the de Blasio administration carry the tough-
ness theme forward with, among other things, use of the tag line “One City, 
Built to Last,” reminiscent of Ford Truck’s 1990s ad campaigns (“Built to 
Last” and “Built Ford Tough”).57 The underlying message appears to be that 
New York City and its residents are tougher than climate change. Illustrative 
of this, the inside cover of A Stronger, More Resilient New York provides the 
following definition of “resilient”:
res•il•ient [ri-zil-yuhnt] adj.
1. Able to bounce back after change or adversity. 2. Capable of preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from difficult conditions.
Syn.: TOUGH
See also: New York City58
56. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). The “toughness” theme is also reinforced through images. See, e.g., id. 
at 6.
57. See City of New York, One City, Built to Last 20 (Revision 1.1 2014); Tanya Gazdik, Ford Boosts 
Ad Spending Behind Jwt’s “Built to Last” Campaign, AdWeek (Feb. 9, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://www.
adweek.com/news/advertising/ford-boosts-ad-spending-behind-jwts-built-last-campaign-23668.
58. Stronger, More Resilient, supra note 36, at 2.
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Consistent with a theme that suggests New Yorkers are tougher than 
climate change, the city’s plans eschew retreat strategies and instead boast 
about continued development of waterfront areas. For example, the city 
reported in its Clean Waterfront Plan that “New Yorkers are taking advan-
tage of the waterfront for recreation, housing, and new business opportuni-
ties in record numbers,”59 and in its coastal management plan that “[n]ew 
housing on waterfront property has helped the city accommodate the influx 
of nearly one million new residents. Since 1992, [when the city adopted its 
first waterfront plan,] more than 20,000 new residential units have been built 
on waterfront blocks, with nearly 6,000 additional new units in the develop-
ment pipeline.”60 By touting waterfront development, New York City and 
other municipalities discount waterfront hazards, promote building in—and 
attract populations to—vulnerable areas, and irrationally delay appropriate 
responses to known risks.
II. Coastal Cities’ Commitment to Rebuild Can 
Reinforce Maladaptive Path-Dependent Processes 
and Fail to Take Advantage of a Window of 
Opportunity to Entrench Support for More Resilient 
Waterfront Policies
The local government toolbox contains a variety of tools that can be used to 
create more resilient waterfronts, including various planning processes, zon-
ing code amendments, building code amendments, moratoria, conservation 
easements, transferable development credits, tax incentives, exactions and 
condemnation, buyouts, public education and private information disclosure 
requirements, and risk mapping tools.61 The nature of the super-wicked class of 
problems, however, makes taking advantage of the tools in the local government 
toolkit difficult. The reward of risk mitigation tends to be ephemeral—either 
the absence of harm or, even worse from a political perspective, the reduc-
tion but not elimination of harm. Moreover, when the harm is something that 
would not occur (or is not perceived to be likely to occur) within the lifespan of 
a government or even within the lifespan of the voting public, the impetus to 
59. N.Y.C. Local Law 55 of 2011: Clean Waterfront Plan 4 (2014).
60. Vision 2020, supra note 36, at 13.
61. See Anne Siders, Management Coastal Retreat: A Legal Handbook on Shifting Develop-
ment Away From Vulnerable Areas 5-7 (Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law, 
2013); see generally J. Grannis, Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea Level Rise and Coastal Land Use 
(Georgetown Climate Center, 2011); John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 
23 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 959, 976-77 (2006); J. Peter Byrne & J. Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, 
in The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change 267-306 (M. Gerrard & K. Kuh eds., 2012).
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educate the public to the risk in order to garner support for spending political 
capital on mitigation is further reduced. Instead, given the lifespan of politi-
cal power,62 rather than educating constituents about medium- and long-term 
risks, elected officials may prefer to increase public support for actions that have 
immediate, visible effects—like increasing the tax base through development 
of high-value coastal properties63—by utilizing messaging and other strategies 
that actually increase the short-sightedness of the public. In this way, commu-
nications that irrationally discount waterfront development risks are both the 
cause and effect of the wicked nature of the problem.
Indeed, municipal plans that utilize themes of toughness and resistance 
may promote a cultural narrative of climate change that further entrenches 
status quo waterfront policies. Robin Kundis Craig has characterized coastal 
communities’ preference for resistance over retreat strategies as a manifesta-
tion of a “technology will save us” cultural narrative that underlies many 
U.S. environmental laws and policies. Consistent with a technology will save 
us narrative, waterfront adaptation strategies focus on human control, mini-
mize disruption and displacement of human activities, and ignore the poten-
tial for sea-level rise to overwhelm coastal technologies.64
Notwithstanding entrenched resistance to restrictions on waterfront 
development, disasters like Hurricane Sandy can create a window of oppor-
tunity to shift waterfront development policy to a new, more resilient policy 
equilibrium. For many residents of the northeastern United States who are 
still displaced and rebuilding more than three years after Hurricane Sandy, 
maintaining the current risk level of medium is not acceptable and a future 
with even greater risk levels is unthinkable.65 In the wake of Sandy, 14 coun-
ties were declared federal disaster areas, 117 lives were lost, approximately 
300,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed, 2,000 miles of roads 
were affected or closed, subways and tunnels were flooded, major power 
transmission and communication systems were damaged, and, more than 
three years after the storm, many residents remain displaced.66 These experi-
62. See Colin Price, Time, Discounting, and Value 125 (Blackwell, London 1993) (“although society 
may be regarded as immortal, a government achieving several terms in office still has a life-span shorter 
than that of an average human”).
63. See John R. Logan & Harvey L. Molotoch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 
57-63 (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1987) (describing municipal narratives of cost- and 
value-free growth and local political pressure for economic growth).
64. Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Live With the Trickster: Narrating Climate Change and the Value of 
Resilience Thinking, Pace Envtl. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016).
65. See, e.g., Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, Repeatedly, the Critics Ask 
Why, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/earth/as-coasts-
rebuild-and-us-pays-again-critics-stop-to-ask-why.html?pagewanted=all.
66. N.Y. State Dep’t of State Office of Planning and Development, RFP 15-OPD-7 for Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement for Long Island Transfer of Development Rights Program 
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ences have resulted in heightened climate risk aversion, which is reflected in 
many local government hazard mitigation plans.67
The heightened risk aversion that follows a major disaster creates an 
opportunity to shift waterfront development policy to a new equilibrium. 
Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner’s ambitious empirical study of shifts in 
American policy from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 
20th century suggests that a shift in focus, like the one following Sandy, pro-
vides a “window” during which policymakers may punctuate an otherwise 
stable policy.68 Using pre- and post-9/11 terrorism policies as an illustration, 
Jones and Baumgartner assert that
Shifting [policy] attention requires a major impetus, and some general intel-
ligence about possible threats would not be enough. The natural tendency is 
to under-emphasize new threats, new ways of thinking of things, new ways to 
organize public bureaucracies, until and unless some significant threshold of 
urgency is crossed. At that point, major changes can occur. . . . Crises seem 
necessary to drive change.69
In the case of climate change generally and waterfront development 
policies specifically, identifying and taking advantage of this window is 
particularly important in light of the “time is running out” nature of the 
policy problem.
However, notwithstanding the magnitude of the devastation caused by 
Sandy, waterfront development policies have shifted only incrementally and 
for the most part have failed to shift toward resilient path-dependent pro-
cesses, with the result being the continued siting of residential communities 
and critical infrastructure in flood zones. Illustrating this cycle of develop-
ment, devastation, and redevelopment that is characteristic of many coastal 
communities,70 New York City and State shifted course away from a state 
property acquisition program that would have permanently preserved proper-
ties as open space71 and instead entered into a Memorandum of Understand-
ing under which the city could purchase vulnerable waterfront properties 
4 (released July 20, 2015).
67. See, e.g., Town of Southold, Natural Hazards Chapter, in Southold 2020: The New Com-
prehensive Plan for the Town of Southold (final draft Sept. 16, 2013) (recognizing various 
risks from sea-level rise).
68. Jones & Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 49-50 (discussing windows in which policy equilibria may 
be punctuated); id. at 21 (discussing data set and methodology).
69. Jones & Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 51.
70. See Siders, supra note 61, at 1 (observing that Dauphin Island, Alabama, has been substantially 
destroyed and rebuilt 10 times in the past 40 years).
71. See Christine A. Fazio & Ethan I. Strell, Government Property Acquisition in Floodplains After Hurricane 
Sandy, Feb. 28, 2013, N.Y. Law J.; 42 U.S.C. §5107c(b)(2)(B)(ii); FEMA, Hazard Mitigation 
Assistance Unified Guidance: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation 
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for redevelopment and resale.72 Along the same vein, the city’s comprehen-
sive coastal management plan identifies as an achievement the rezoning of 
approximately 3,000 acres of shorefront land to enable redevelopment, about 
one-half of which was rezoned from non-residential to mixed-use and from 
lower to higher-density.73
These redevelopment policies and zoning code amendments are touted as 
resilience oriented, notwithstanding the fact that more than eight million 
New Yorkers live in areas vulnerable to flooding, storm surges, and other 
natural disaster-related risks,74 and nearly one-half million of these residents 
live on 120 square miles of land that is less than six feet above the high-tide 
line.75 Moreover, as a result of climate-related factors and land subsidence, 
sea level in New York City has risen 1.1 feet since 1900, approximately 1.2 
inches per decade, a rate nearly two times the global average.76 As Strauss 
et al. of Climate Central observe, “Looking forward under a fast sea-level 
rise scenario, [Climate Central] compute[s] a 3-in-4 chance of historically 
unprecedented coastal flooding in New York City by 2100—or a 1-in-10 
chance under a slow rise scenario.”77 According to NPCC2, an ongoing body 
established by New York City law to regularly update and report on region-
specific climate data and projections, sea-level rise is projected to accelerate as 
the century progresses, rising in New York City 11 to 21 inches by the 2050s, 
18 to 39 inches by the 2080s, and as much as six feet by 2100 (over average 
2000-2005 levels).78
Program, Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, Repetitive Flood Claims Program, Severe 
Repetitive Loss Program 75, 94-97 (2010).
72. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of New York and the City of New York Concern-
ing the Purchase of Properties Affected by Superstorm Sandy (Dec. 16, 2013).
73. Vision 2020, supra note 36, at 13.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Strauss et al., supra note 53, at 8. This vulnerable land is also home to more than 1,500 miles of 
road, 1,200 EPA-listed sites, and 100 public schools. Id.
76. New York City Panel on Climate Change, Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations, 
Climate Change Projections, and Maps 8 (Cynthia Rosenzweig & William Solecki eds., 2013) 
(finding that approximately 45% of the observed sea-level rise of 1.2 inches per decade since 1900 is 
due to land subsidence, with the remaining sea-level rise driven by climate-related factors).
77. Strauss et al., supra note 53, at 11.
78. Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Building the Knowledge Base for Climate Resiliency: New York City Panel 
on Climate Change 2015 Report, 1336 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1, 11 (2015). See also infra Part III 
(discussing the city’s robust, transparent, and science-based data collection, analysis, and benchmark-
ing initiatives).
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III. Utilizing Transparent Risk Projections and Land Use 
Planning Processes to Expand and Entrench Support 
for Resilient Waterfront Policies
We know intuitively that climate change poses intractable obstacles and 
waterfront development restrictions are politically unpopular. So, why bother 
identifying these policy problems as wicked or super-wicked? The point cer-
tainly is not to sit around and lament the problems,79 but rather to “tame” 
them.80 The wicked and super-wicked constructs prove useful only insofar 
as they help inform responses to the problems. By identifying a problem 
as wicked or super-wicked, lawmakers and analysts can recognize from the 
outset that the problem is “highly resistant to resolution,”81 avoid strategies 
that are known not to work with such problems, and utilize “policy analysis 
techniques that are consistent with, rather than ignore, the key features of 
this class of problems.”82
Climate change generally and waterfront hazard mitigation specifically 
have temporal free rider challenges such that strategies to counteract these 
problems must overcome the tendency to give greater weight to immediate 
interests, discount future threats, and delay behavioral changes, even when 
doing so is contrary to medium- and long-term interests.83 To overcome this, 
Levin et al. assert that policymakers need to address three diagnostic ques-
tions when addressing super-wicked problems: (DQ1) “What can be done to 
create stickiness making reversibility immediately difficult?”; (DQ2) “What 
can be done to entrench support over time?”; and (DQ3) “What can be done 
to expand the population that supports the policy?”84 They posit that DQ2 
and DQ3 are “prerequisites” because they must occur to develop path depen-
dency to address super-wicked problems, while DQ1 is “useful” because it 
“[b]uys time,” but is not a prerequisite “as long as increasing support over 
time kicks in quite quickly.”85
79. Chris Riedy, Climate Change Is a Super Wicked Problem, Planetcentric (May 29, 2013), http://
chrisriedy.me/2013/05/29/climate-change-is-a-super-wicked-problem/.
80. Rittel & Webber, supra note 9 (contrasting wicked and tame problems); John C. Camillus, Strategy 
as a Wicked Problem, Harv. Bus. Rev. online (May 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/05/strategy-as-a-
wicked-problem (arguing that wicked problems cannot be solved, but can be tamed).
81. Australian Public Serv. Comm’n, Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective 
iii (2007).
82. Levin et al., supra note 11, at 129.
83. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1183 (discussing “‘free riders,’ who exploit the ecosystem commons to 
maximize their gains or minimize their losses by relying on others to make the necessary sacrifices”).
84. Levin et al., supra note 11, at 129.
85. Id. at 130; see also Jones & Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 49 (“The general phenomenon of policies 
reproducing themselves through time is known as path dependency. Once a path is chosen, it tends 
to be followed. Moving off the path can be difficult.” (citation omitted)). For example, rather than 
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Thus, focusing more on entrenchment and expansion, Levin et al. argue 
that small policy changes can trigger path-dependent processes that can gain 
durability and expand over time.86 This approach has at least two benefits 
over one-shot approaches that focus on creating immediate stickiness. First, 
to create immediate stickiness, a policy would have to include features that 
make it difficult to undo and would as a result be subject to attack as anti-
democratic.87 Second, such a policy would likely entail a large shift from the 
status quo, an approach that tends to be met with resistance.88 Ultimately, 
rather than focusing on one-shot policy changes (whether they create sticki-
ness or not), Levin et al. suggest that focusing on norms, values, and coali-
tion-building can “unleash[ ] path-dependent trajectories.”89 An approach to 
shifting policy equilibria by changing norms and values also finds support 
in a growing body of research that suggests that emotional responses to risk 
are an important component of rational risk regulation.90 However, given 
the time-is-running-out nature of super-wicked problems, approaches that 
expand and entrench support incrementally must nevertheless be capable of 
changing behavior quickly.
Land use planning processes offer an opportunity to build coalitions and 
shift norms and values toward resilience. Participants in interactive plan-
ning processes not only influence the norms and values underlying the plan, 
but likely also experience shifts in their own values as a result of their par-
ticipation. Many land use planning processes—for example, community 
engagement initiatives, visioning, and charrettes91—facilitate collaborative 
decisionmaking through intensive, personal engagement in project plan-
ning. These processes often engage participants in self-advocacy, public com-
developing skills related to relocation, students, developers, builders, and others respond to policies 
that promote rebuilding by developing skills related to armoring shores, buildings, and infrastructure 
against flood risks.
86. Levin et al., supra note 11, at 125.
87. But see Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1195-1204 (discussing and rejecting anti-democratic critique of 
policies that create stickiness).
88. Levin et al., supra note 11, at 125 (“one-shot ‘big bang’ policies for super wicked problems, which 
require behavioral change by all relevant populations immediately, either fail to garner adequate sup-
port or, in those rare cases where such policies are adopted, are likely to produce societal ‘shocks’ that 
hamper implementation and compliance, derailing a policy no matter how well designed”).
89. Id.
90. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 744 (2008).
91. A charrette is a collaborative brainstorming session “intended to build consensus among participants, 
develop specific design goals and solutions for a project, and motivate participants and stakeholders 
to be committed to reaching those goals.” Gail Lindsey et al., A Handbook for Planning and 
Conducting Charrettes for High Performance Projects 1 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., 2d 
ed. 2012), available at http://www.nrel.gov/sustainable_nrel/pdfs/44051.pdf. See also Danielle Berg-
strom et al., The Sustainable Communities Initiative: The Community Engagement Guide for Sustainable 
Communities, J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L., 2014, at 191, 194-95 (discussing 
strategies for engaging marginalized communities in traditional planning processes).
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mitment to a vision, and validation of the vision through shared personal 
experiences. Research on changing deeply held beliefs suggests that these 
attributes—self-advocacy, public commitment, and validation through per-
sonal experience—can effect lasting, cognitively accessible changes in par-
ticipants’ deeply held beliefs.92
However, without transparent communication regarding waterfront risks, 
participants in land use planning processes are hobbled in their ability to 
engage with the issues. Analogizing to research on complex adaptive systems, 
John Nolon observes that effective communication of information is a key 
component in successful adaptation to stressful events.
In nature and in human organizations, the systems that thrive are those that 
have established effective mechanisms for exchanging, evaluating, and react-
ing to information among their component parts. As stress occurs, informa-
tion is gathered at the lowest level of the system and relayed to higher levels 
that digest and synthesize that information. Then, through continued com-
munication, system behaviors are reordered to react and adapt to change. . . . 
Through continued and effective communication .  .  . the system adapts in 
unpredictable but generally successful ways as it deals with external events.93
By accurately communicating about risks, local governments can also 
increase the diversity of participants in the planning process, thereby involv-
ing actors who may be more amenable to punctuating policy equilibria. As 
Jones and Baumgartner observe,
[An] oft-noted reason for the difficulty in shifting policy direction stems from 
continuity of participation in key governmental positions.  .  .  . [E]nacting 
change often requires the involvement of a diverse range of policymakers. 
Many of these, including those in important gate-keeping positions, typically 
were involved in creating the earlier policy or at least in administering it.94
Failing to communicate accurately about waterfront risks limits those 
who understand the risks to insiders and experts, thereby exacerbating a lack 
92. See, e.g., Joshua Aronson et al., Reducing the Effects of Stereotype Threat on African American College 
Students by Shaping Theories of Intelligence, 38 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 113, 116-23 (2002) 
(empirical study identifying conditions for influencing persistent, cognitively accessible changes in 
attitudes including advocacy in a person’s own words, public commitment, and validation by personal 
experience); see generally Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Of Old Dogs and New Tricks: Can Law Schools Really 
Fix Students’ Fixed Mindsets, 19 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 3, 23-31 (2014) (discussing 
and citing research on facilitating long-lasting, cognitively accessible changes in deeply held beliefs); 
John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 23 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 905, 915 (2006) (analyzing changes within and among communities observed in 
author’s experience working with local governments).
93. Nolon, supra note 92, at 916.
94. Jones & Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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of diversity in the planning process that, as Jones and Baumgartner assert, 
makes change difficult.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, discounting of risk in local government communications about 
climate change and waterfront development likely reinforces existing mal-
adaptive path-dependent processes. By adopting toughness narratives, reject-
ing retreat strategies outright, or otherwise discounting risks following a 
major storm like Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy, municipalities fail to take 
advantage of a window of opportunity in which public support likely exists 
for a shift to more resilient, albeit restrictive, waterfront development poli-
cies. By recognizing waterfront hazard mitigation as a super-wicked problem, 
which is characterized by time-is-running-out features and which requires 
entrenchment and expansion of support for resilience in order to break the 
cycle of development, destruction, and redevelopment, local governments, 
with the support of federal and state governments, can and should begin 
to evaluate and seize upon opportunities to shift policies toward resilience. 
Such opportunities likely begin with official communications that accurately 
portray risk, including waterfront and hazard mitigation plans and flood risk 
maps, which can then lead to planning processes and changes in zoning and 
building codes and private market behavior consistent with near- and long-
term risks.

